Strengthening Information Resilience and Countering FIMI in Europe: Valentyn Koval Presented Ukraine’s Experience at a Conference in Chișinău

20.03.2026

On March 20, an international conference entitled “Media Literacy and Information Integrity: Building Resilience to Disinformation and FIMI in Europe” was held in Chișinău. The First Deputy Chair of the National Council, Valentyn Koval, took part in the event.

The conference was organized by the Council of Europe together with partners within the framework of the New Democratic Pact for Europe. The event brought together representatives of governments, media regulators, international organizations, experts, and researchers from various countries to coordinate approaches to countering disinformation and strengthening information resilience.

Valentyn Koval joined the panel discussion “Fighting Disinformation and FIMI in the Digital Age.” Together with representatives of European institutions, the governments of Norway and Latvia, and experts from the Council of Europe, he spoke about how information threats are evolving under the influence of digital platforms.

The panel was opened by Michael O’Flaherty, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. He outlined three key principles for countering disinformation in a democratic society: respect for human rights and freedom of expression, proportionality and justification of state actions, as well as the development of media literacy, support for independent media, and trust in institutions.

During the panel discussion, participants focused on the phenomenon of FIMI – foreign information manipulation and interference. They spoke about the mechanisms of modern disinformation: its rapid spread through online platforms, its influence on public opinion, and the risks it poses to trust in democratic institutions.

During the discussion, Valentyn Koval presented Ukraine’s experience in countering systemic foreign information influence.

He emphasized that for decades Ukraine has been a testing ground for such campaigns conducted by Russia. Media literacy in Ukraine was shaped within civil society and non-governmental organizations long before academic institutions or the state became actively involved. This emerged as a direct response to the need for information resilience in the context of ongoing information warfare.

Since 2014, Ukraine has introduced a number of proactive measures against Russian propaganda. The distribution of 80 Russian television channels, which were freely broadcast through Ukrainian cable networks, was stopped. Popular social networks such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, as well as email services Mail.ru and Yandex Mail and the search and navigation system Yandex Maps, were also blocked. Even before the full-scale invasion of 2022, three major pro-Russian Ukrainian TV channels with large audiences were banned through sanctions imposed on their owners. At that time, Ukraine faced criticism from the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and journalistic organizations, but nevertheless defended its position, stressing that freedom of expression is not the same as war propaganda or hate speech. These decisive measures helped protect Ukraine’s information space.

He also explained that Europe initially did not recognize the seriousness of the FIMI phenomenon and only after a series of events – such as elections in Moldova and Romania, Brexit, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election – did it begin to pay attention to the scale of such threats.

The methodology of such Russian information campaigns is almost identical. First, a narrative appears on little-known platforms – Telegram channels, social media comments, or obscure websites. Then it spreads on a large scale: bots repost it, and “troll factories” disseminate the content across different networks.

Next, the narrative appears in the comments of pseudo‑experts – sometimes attempting to refute it, sometimes citing authoritative publications. Eventually, it is spread across major social networks and channels together with videos and images. The use of artificial intelligence significantly amplifies the effect, as it enables the rapid creation of numerous variations of media content.

Even when falsehoods are successfully debunked, such campaigns often leave an emotional imprint on people. The initial emotional reaction persists and continues to influence the perception of information.

“For decades, Ukraine has been under pressure from Russia’s information attacks. In response, we acted proactively – from restricting Russian media resources and services to imposing sanctions against pro-Russian channels. At the same time, it is important to clearly distinguish between freedom of expression and war propaganda or hate speech. Resilience against disinformation is impossible without the development of media literacy, support for responsible media, and systematic filling of the information space with high-quality and reliable content,” he noted.

At the conclusion of his speech, Valentyn Koval advised familiarizing oneself with a detailed material on countering FIMI in Ukraine, which was published on the website of the European Audiovisual Observatory.

Viktors Makarovs, Special Envoy on Digital Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, emphasized the growing role of artificial intelligence. In his view, AI simplifies and accelerates the creation and dissemination of manipulative content. This complicates the timely detection of disinformation and represents yet another challenge for modern democracy. It is particularly dangerous for young people and children, who consume information not only through digital online platforms.

Today, disinformation affects the media space, security, democratic processes, and public trust. Conference participants stressed that effective counteraction to such threats requires a combination of state policy, platform responsibility, the development of media literacy, and international cooperation.

The conference became a platform for a professional discussion on the challenges of the modern information environment and confirmed that strengthening resilience to disinformation is possible only through systematic and coordinated actions at both the national and international levels.


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