This was the key question around which the discussion revolved during the round table “Building institutional capacity to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in Ukraine”, held on March 19. Participants spoke about the consequences of coordinated disinformation and manipulative interventions for countries worldwide, for democratic processes in general, and for elections in particular. Most importantly, they discussed how to protect against such threats and how to effectively counter them. Member of the National Council Oleksandr Burmahin took part in the discussion.
Since 2014 and throughout the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has been a primary target of numerous manipulative information operations. Official reports from the European External Action Service confirm this. In fact, in 2025 alone, more than 50% of all incidents detected across Europe were directed against Ukraine.
At the same time, this has become a challenge for the entire democratic world, and many countries have already suffered the destructive impact of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). The need to protect the institution of elections is especially critical. This is evidenced, in particular, by the experiences of Moldova and Romania, where coordinated manipulative campaigns were recorded through social media platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, and others.
Participants of the round table analyzed which model of countering FIMI could be most effective for Ukraine, with representatives from France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom sharing their experiences. In France, a special agency called Viginum was established to serve as a technical service for detecting, analyzing, and documenting foreign information influences. In Sweden, a dedicated institution known as the Psychological Defence Agency operates to protect society against disinformation and psychological manipulation. In the United Kingdom, these functions are distributed among three bodies – the Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
At the European Union level, the authority to detect and counter FIMI lies with the European External Action Service. According to Jakob Tamm, Deputy Head of the Division for Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, the organization does not view FIMI as a communication problem but rather as a weapon. The main focus of its work is to study and establish who is behind the manipulations and who is actually “pulling the trigger.”
Participants emphasized that effective counteraction and prevention of information manipulation and influence requires partnership and joint action both at the level of European countries and through the involvement of state institutions, civil society organizations, media, and businesses within each country.
The Ukrainian media regulator, noted Oleksandr Burmahin, has been working specifically on foreign influences since 2014, when the active phase of the aggressor state’s interference in Ukraine’s affairs began, although hybrid manifestations in the information sphere had been observed much earlier. Among the numerous response measures taken by the National Council is the ongoing advocacy at the international level for the application of sanctions against Russian media companies and propagandists.
“We are sincerely convinced that there are no media and no journalists in Russia. All of this is merely instruments of information warfare and an extension of Kremlin policy,” he said.
According to Oleksandr Burmahin, the main challenge for Ukraine is the lack of a legislative framework regarding FIMI. “We lack definitions of ‘disinformation’ and ‘manipulation.’” On the one hand, disinformation is quite a broad concept, and everyone understands that it can pose a threat to freedom of speech. Therefore, the difficult challenge is to balance the protection of state interests with human rights.
The organizational architecture itself should consist of various institutions working in close cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to designate a main coordinating body in this area. This could be the Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. The media regulator, for its part, is ready to become part of such an association within the framework of its mandate to work with media.
A member of the National Council is convinced that the mechanism for countering FIMI must operate on a permanent basis. During elections, following the example of France, it could be granted somewhat expanded powers. “We must move forward and be prepared for electoral processes.” Much work needs to be done at the strategic level, and it is also necessary “to maintain and develop this momentum into concrete decisions and acts.” The path from concept to the implementation of legislation is a long one. Moreover, 50% of the effectiveness and success of legislation depends on the adoption of secondary regulations and the mechanism for their overall enforcement.
Stanislav Lurye, head of the Osavul company’s office in Ukraine, shared the experience of using the AI platform developed for detecting and forecasting FIMI and hybrid threats during elections in various countries around the world (several slides).
Yuliia Shypilova, Programme Manager at International IDEA, proposed creating a working group from among the participants of the discussion, which would operate on a permanent basis to develop solutions regarding the issue under consideration.
The event was organized by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, the National Council, FBA, International IDEA, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, with the support of Norway, Sweden, and co‑funding from the EU.
The event was also attended by:
- Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, Chairman of the Committee on Freedom of Speech, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- Vegard Gjaerum Stensrud, Counceller for Political Affairs, Embassy of Norway;
- Kristina Danielsson, Head of Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden;
- Nemo Stjernström, Head of the Strategic Communications Department, Swedish Psychological Defence Agency;
- Yaropol Vzhyk, representative of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office;
- Julian Merer, representative of the International Cooperation Unit of Viginum’s Strategic Department;
- Giorgi Jokhadze, Project Manager at the Cybercrime Division, Council of Europe;
- Filippa Almlund, expert on hybrid threats in the Democracy and Governance Department at the Folke Bernadotte Academy,
as well as representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Center for Countering Disinformation, and media experts.
